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HENRY MORE’S “SPIRIT OF 
NATURE” AND NEWTON’S 
AETHER
Abstract: Th e paper presents the no-
tion of “Spirit of Nature” in Henry More
and describes its position within More’s
philosophical system. Th rough a  thor-
ough analysis, it tries to show in what 
respects it can be considered a scientifi c 
object (especially taking into account the
goals of More’s natural philosophy) and 
in what respects it cannot. In the second 
part of this paper, More’s “Spirit of Na-
ture” is compared to Newton’s various
attempts at presenting a  metaphysical 
cause of the force of gravity, using the
similarities between the two to see this
notorious problem of Newton scholar-
ship in a  new light. One thus sees that 
if Newton drew from Stoic and Neo-
Platonic theories of aether or soul of the
world, we need to fully acknowledge the
fact that these substances were tradition-
ally of a  non-dualistic, half-corporeal,
half-spiritual nature. Both More’s “Spirit 
of Nature” and Newton’s aether can thus
be understood as diff erent attempts at 
incorporating such a  pneumatic theory 
into the framework of modern physics,
as it was then being formed.
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Morův Spirit of Nature
a Newtonův éter
Abstrakt: Příspěvek představuje
pojem Spirit of Nature u  Henryho 
Mora a  jeho pozici v  rámci Morova 
fi losofi ckého systému. Důkladnou 
analýzou se pokouší ukázat, v jakých 
ohledech je možné jej (s  ohledem 
na  cíle Morovy přírodní fi losofi e) 
považovat za  vědecký objekt a  v  ja-
kých nikoli. Následně se pokouší 
na  základě podobností Morova 
Spirit of Nature s  Newtonovými 
pokusy o metafyzické vysvětlení pří-
činy gravitační síly nabídnout nový 
vhled do této v rámci newtonovských 
bádání zásadní otázky. Ukazuje se 
totiž, že pokud Newton čerpal ze 
stoických a  novoplatónských teorií 
éteru a  světové duše, je třeba vzít 
v  potaz silně nedualistické, tělesně-
-duchovní pojetí těchto substancí. 
Spirit of Nature i  Newtonův éter by 
tak bylo možné chápat pouze jako 
různé pokusy, jak takovéto tradiční 
pojetí pneumatu začlenit do rodící se 
moderní fyziky.
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Introduction
Th e main topic of my paper is going to be the “Spirit of Nature”, a spiritual 
substance that, according to 17th century Cambridge Platonist Henry More, 
pervades the whole of the universe and moves inert matter in such a way as 
to bring about all sorts of phenomena that cannot be explained by purely 
mechanical laws. Th is topic may feel a bit out of place, since such a  thing 
doesn’t really look like a scientifi c object. Th at’s why I am fi rst going to pre-
sent a general description of More’s metaphysical system and of the place of 
the “Spirit of Nature” in it, arguing that if we take into account the preoc-
cupations of More and the interconnectedness of metaphysics and physics in 
that period, there defi nitely are respects in which the “Spirit of Nature” can 
be considered as a scientifi c object.
In my analysis, however, it will also become apparent that the “Spirit 
of Nature” acts rather as a metaphysical ground for mechanicism than as 
a direct explanatory principle. Th is, as I  shall argue, is one of the reasons 
why it didn’t really have a place in the newly-formed physics of Newton and 
his followers. As such, it is only natural that the “Spirit of Nature” as a scien-
tifi c object disappeared from scientifi c discourse before it ever really entered 
into it. In this sense, it can be put in parallel with Newton’s aether theories 
and other attempts at providing a  cause for gravity. In both cases we are 
looking at a metaphysical ground of science, the main diff erence being that 
while Newton pushes it into the background and focuses on mathematical 
formulae, for More, the “Spirit of Nature” is supposed to act as a full-fl edged 
explanatory principle. Paradoxically enough, it is Newton’s aether that ulti-
mately became a bona fi de scientifi c object and inspired a long tradition of 
ether theories in modern physics. Although my intention won’t be to strictly 
claim any form of direct infl uence of More on Newton, I will try to develop 
A. R. Hall’s claim that “only if Newton’s metaphysical views are irrelevant 
to the writing of the Principia (and, we might add, of Opticks too) is it pos-
sible to deny to More any possible infl uence upon the transformation of the
mechanical philosophy eff ected by Newton in these works.“1 Th e parallels 
I am going to draw between More’s “Spirit of Nature” and Newton’s possible 
causes of gravity will, I believe, shed some new light on the question of how 
1  Alfred R. HALL, “Henry More and the Scientifi c Revolution.” In: HUTTON, S. (ed.), Henry 
More (1614–1687). Tercentenary Studies. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990, p. 50 (37–54).
Th is paper was created as part of the project “Renaissance philosophy and science” (GA ČR 
15-0680S).
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much Newton drew from (and transformed) ancient Stoic and Neo-Platonic 
theories.
I. Henry More’s “Spirit of Nature”
In Henry More’s philosophy, two diff erent traditions of thought intertwine. 
Th e fi rst of these is Neo-Platonism, drawing from sources like Plotinus, 
Proclus or Ficino, while the other is the philosophical tradition of 17th cen-
tury natural philosophy, especially its debates around mechanicism and the 
related threat of atheism. Although More was one of the fi rst to introduce 
Descartes’s new philosophy to England, his opinion of it wasn’t as uncriti-
cal as it might have seemed at fi rst. While he sees himself and Descartes as 
ultimately aiming for the same goal, “the one travailing in the lower Rode of
Democritisme, amidst the thick dust of Atoms and fl ying particles of Matter, 
the other tracing it over the high and aiery Hills of Platonisme, in that more
thin and subtil Region of Immateriality,”2 at the same time, when he sets out 
to write to Descartes as early as 1648, he fi nds he cannot agree with him on 
everything, writing:
But indeed, illustrious Descartes, so as not to conceal anything, although 
I  value very much the most beautiful bulk and essence of your Philosophy, 
I must however confess there are some minor things that elude me in the second 
part of the Principles that certainly my spirit is either too dull to understand 
or too repugnant to accept. Yet your most excellent Philosophy is in no way 
endangered in the main strokes thereof, since these scruples are such that while 
they may be judged deservedly to be false or uncertain, they do not reach to 
anything that is fundamental or essential to your philosophy; and it might very 
well stand on its own without them.3
Later on, when he composes his Enchiridion Metaphysicum in 1671, it is 
with the explicit intention of dismantling Cartesianism, as can be seen from 
More’s correspondence during that time.4
2 Henry MORE, Collection of Several Philosophical Works. James Flesher: London 1662, 
Preface, p. xii (More’s emphasis).
3  More to Descartes, Dec. 11, 1648. In: ADAM, C. – TANNERY, P. (eds.), Oeuvres de Descartes
V. Paris: Léopold Cerf 1903, p. 238.
4 Cf. Alexander JACOB, Henry More’s Manual of Metaphysics 1: Chapters 1–10 and 27–28. 
Hildesheim: G. Olms Verlag 1995, p. vff .
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Despite the appearances, this is not an example of a philosopher doing 
an ideological U-turn, as has already been pointed out by others.5 More’s fi rst 
and foremost concern had always been the fi ght against atheism. Originally, 
he perceived Cartesianism as a great weapon, showing the full strength and 
scope of the new mechanistic philosophy, while – more importantly – also 
showing all its shortcomings, leading to the postulation of immaterial sub-
stances, the most perfect of which (and the only necessarily existing) was 
God. In the end, however, he realized that Descartes gave too much attention 
to mechanicism and played down the importance of spiritual substances – 
most of all by not granting them extension (more on that later). What this 
meant was that although Descartes’s intentions were undoubtedly good, 
his followers, seeing only the mechanical aspects of his philosophy and 
fascinated by them, fell into full-fl edged atheism. Th e only way to combat 
this threat, then, was to fully show all the weaknesses of Cartesianism and 
demonstrate the extent to which spiritual substances are needed to support 
mechanical philosophy. Simply put, More eventually realized that all those 
minor scruples he mentioned in his fi rst letter turned out to sway the whole 
system in a  strongly atheistic direction, a  thing he could not tolerate, no 
matter how highly he esteemed Descartes’s mechanical genius.
Th e fi rst step in reasserting the importance of spiritual substances was 
to grant them extension. For More, extension is a characteristic not just of 
physical matter but of any substance whatsoever, according to the principle 
that “there is no real Entity but what is in some sense extended.”6 While Car-
tesians thought that spirits are present in space only by virtue of their power, 
for More, denying any actual spatial extension to them was tantamount 
to saying they don’t exist at all. Th e problem was that Descartes perceived 
extension as tied to impenetrability. More thinks that there very well can 
be extended substances that can share their space with other substances – 
that is exactly what spirits and souls are! So while More accepts the general 
traits of Descartes’s dualistic view of the world, he draws the dividing line in 
a quite diff erent way. All substances are extended, even having parts outside 
parts,7 with matter being divisible, impenetrable and absolutely passive, 
5  Cf. Alan GABBEY, “Henry More and the Limits of Mechanism.” In: HUTTON, S. (ed.), 
Henry More, pp. 19–36.
6  MORE, Collection of Several Philosophical Works, Preface General, § 12, p. xii.
7  In the Enchiridion Metaphysicum, chap. 27, § 14 (JACOB, Henry More’s Manual of Metaphysics
2: Chapters 11–26. Hildesheim: G. Olms Verlag 1995, p. 111f.), More claims that the sensitive
part of the soul is localized in the head, so that even if we grew an eye on our foot, it wouldn’t 
be able to see, unless connected to the head with some nerves.
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while spirits are indivisible, penetrable and the only possible source of activ-
ity in the world.8 Th is aspect of the passivity of matter as opposed to the 
activity of spirits is very important, as More is convinced that the interaction 
of purely passive pieces of matter very oft en falls short as an explanatory 
principle. Spiritual substances are needed to account for the behaviour of 
humans and animals – these all have individual souls – but they are also 
needed to explain a lot of other phenomena like gravitation, magnetism or 
thunder, lightning and rainbows. Th ese are all caused by a specifi c spiritual 
substance, namely the “Spirit of Nature”.
More defi nes the “Spirit of Nature” as “A  Substance incorporeal, but 
without Sense and Animadversion, pervading the whole Matter of the 
Universe, and exercising a Plastical power therein according to the sundry 
predispositions and occasions in the parts it works upon, raising such Phae-
nomena in the World, by directing the parts of Matter and their Motion, 
as cannot be resolved into Mere mechanical powers.”9 We see that – to use
Alan Gabbey’s phrase – the “Spirit of Nature” is basically defi ned as a “Spirit 
of causal gaps”, an omnipresent spirit devoid of any free will or thoughts of 
its own that steps in whenever something happens that could not be caused 
by purely mechanical interactions.
For example, let’s take gravitation, a  very puzzling problem for 17th
century science. Hobbes’s explanation was that gravitation is caused by tiny 
particles of ethereal matter moving randomly through space and constantly 
hitting other bodies thus pushing them down, while for Descartes, these 
particles were swirling in a vortex around the Earth. Th ese theories had to 
face a lot of problems. If the particles move in a more or less random fashion, 
how come they always end up pushing the objects down instead of pushing 
them in all directions more or less equally, cancelling each other out? How 
come, also, that the particles cannot be blocked by an especially smooth sur-
face thus changing the angle at which things fall to the ground? If someone 
shoots a bullet up into the air, how come that the tiny and very light particles 
of aether still somehow manage to slow down the bullet and pull it back 
down, despite both its velocity and its density?10 According to More, these 
8 See e.g. Henry MORE, Th e Immortality of the Soul, book I, chap. 3, § 1, p. 21 (in: MORE, 
Collection of Several Philosophical Works), or Henry MORE, Divine Dialogues. Joseph
Downing: London 1713, dial. 1, §§ 29–30, p. 61ff .
9 Th e Immortality of the Soul, book III, chap. 12, § 1 (in: MORE, Collection of Several 
Philosophical Works, p. 193; emphasis omitted).
10 Th ese common objections are formulated by Henry More e.g. in Th e Immortality of the Soul, 
book III, chap. 13 (MORE, Collection of Several Philosophical Works, p. 196ff .).
Henry More’s “Spirit of Nature” and Newton’s Aether
342
are all valid objections. Th e bullet should indeed continue fl ying straight up 
into space (More reports this has even sometimes been observed with can-
nonballs), a suffi  ciently smooth mirror should indeed defl ect the aether thus
changing the direction of gravitation, and most of all, the random move-
ment of the particles of aether should indeed be pushing in all directions
equally, so that there wouldn’t be any gravitation at all in the fi rst place, if 
everything went purely according to mechanical laws. Th e fact that things are
not like this serves in itself as proof that there are some non-mechanical and 
therefore immaterial causes at work, namely the “Spirit of Nature” that acts 
as the vital force unifying the movement of the tiny particles so that things 
fall down to the ground.11
In the Enchiridion Metaphysicum, the most notable of More’s works in
this regard, a  lot of other natural phenomena get a similar treatment. Th e 
modus operandi is the same in all cases, be it with pressure, tides, rainbows,
magnetism or thunder and lightning. A mechanical explanation (most usu-
ally the Cartesian one) is presented, followed by several objections. Aft er
More has shown the necessary insuffi  ciency of the mechanical explanation, 
he concludes an immaterial cause has to be responsible, this cause being the
“Spirit of Nature”.
In all these cases, then, it could be argued that the “Spirit of Nature” 
is presented as a  scientifi c object, something that is brought in to explain
a given phenomenon, to integrate it into a scientifi c framework. Yet at the 
same time, the “Spirit of Nature” doesn’t seem to be doing that much ex-
planatory work. Given the way the “Spirit of Nature” is defi ned, saying that
it is the cause of this or that phenomenon doesn’t really say anything more
than that the laws of mechanics we have available fail to explain it. To repeat, 
the “Spirit of Nature” indeed acts as a “Spirit of causal gaps” that just steps in
whenever we don’t have a more satisfactory explanation.
Th is problem becomes all the more evident when we consider how we 
know whether a given phenomenon should be explained through mechani-
cal laws or by the “Spirit of Nature”. Th e best criterion at our disposal seems 
to be whether the phenomenon behaves regularly or not. From one point of 
view, this would mean that the “Spirit of Nature” acts according to certain 
laws and thus brings regularity into a world that would otherwise consist
11  Th e fact that some cannonballs have been observed not to fall back to the ground is due to 
the fact that at a certain distance from the surface of the Earth, the “Spirit of Nature” stops 
trying to pull the cannonball down and just lets it behave according to mechanical laws (Th e 
Immortality of the Soul, book III, chap. 13, § 6; MORE, Collection of Several Philosophical 
Works, p. 198f.).
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only in bits of matter chaotically fl ying around and bumping into each other. 
On the other hand, we would be intuitively inclined to feel that these purely 
mechanical interactions have some regularity of their own – More himself 
speaks of mechanical laws, aft er all. Albeit mechanical interactions are not
teleologically ordered, anytime two particles hit each other, their respec-
tive directions and speeds aft er the collision are determined in a  law-like
manner. Th is point of view leads to the opposite of what we have originally 
stated: it would then seem that the mechanical interactions are what behaves 
according to a set of laws and the “Spirit of Nature” steps in whenever these 
laws have to be circumvented. But this would transform the “Spirit of Na-
ture” into some sort of permanent miracle-worker, leading to the question 
whether a law-like, permanent miracle can still be called a miracle.
More, for one, does not seem to see the “Spirit of Nature” as perma-
nently breaking the laws of nature but rather as constituting those laws. Th is 
is exactly one of the reasons why he so emphatically insists on the fact that 
the “Spirit of Nature” has no “Sense or Animadversion”. Devoid of any free
will, the “Spirit of Nature” does not choose to act in a certain way, it just 
does. Th at is why gravitation can sometimes cause a falling object to hurt an 
innocent person or why the “Spirit of Nature” can sometimes act against its 
own “interest”.12 But if the opposition between mechanical interactions and
the “Spirit of Nature” is the case of one set of law-like regularities opposing
another (as I already pointed out, More is talking about “purely mechanical 
laws” as well), how do we tell into which category a given phenomenon fi ts? 
Later, we will see that this dichotomy is for More at least partially a false one 
but right now, unfortunately, the only answer we seem to have available is 
a circular one: some phenomena in principle cannot be explained mecha-
nistically. Th is brings us back to the point I mentioned earlier – the “Spirit 
of Nature” only acts as a catch-all phrase for whatever we cannot explain 
otherwise. Or at least for whatever we think we cannot explain otherwise, 
as we can never really be sure whether an as of yet unknown mechanical 
explanation may not be coming.
Concerning this, More was convinced that Descartes presented pretty 
much the most accomplished form of mechanistic philosophy possible. Th at 
is why, in the Enchiridion Metaphysicum as well as in other works, he feels
that confuting Descartes (a fortiori in what he considers to be the most basic 
12  Th at would be the case with Boyle’s experiments with the vacuum air-pump, more on that 
below.
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mechanical phenomena) amounts to confuting mechanicism in general. In 
a letter to Hyrne (who came up exactly with this remark), he writes:
As for your two objections, whereof the former is, Th at though these Mechani-
call solutions be false, yet my inference of an incorporeall being from thence 
is not solid or necessary, because, we are not assured, but other Mechanicall 
solutions in time may be found that will truly solve these Phaenomena, I answer 
fi rst, Th at though this doth not amount to a perfect dry demonstration, such as 
is in Mathematicks, yet it is an exceeding high probability, scarce any higher in 
the guidance of ye aff aires of our life. For it seemes exceeding improbable that so 
excellent a Wit, the greatest Mathematician in Europe, and of such an eximious 
Architectonical Genius in Mechanicks as Cartesius, should faile in ye solutions 
of so many & so plain & simple Phaenomena as I have proved he has failed in, if 
ye presence it self of such Mechanicall solutions were not without foundation or 
a groundlesse presumption.13
Th us More really explicitly assumes that if Cartesianism fails, mechanis-
tic philosophy as a whole fails as well and furthermore, that if these fail, the 
best alternative explanation is his “Spirit of Nature”. But how does the “Spirit 
of Nature” work as an explanatory concept? What does such an explanation 
look like? Th ese are quite diffi  cult questions related directly to a change in 
the perception of science that occurred during the Scientifi c Revolution. 
Th is is of course too vast a subject to cover in one paper so we will have to 
stick only to some general remarks. Th ese remarks are however crucial in 
understanding in what respects the “Spirit of Nature” was a scientifi c object 
and in what respects it was not.
II. Th e “Spirit of Nature” as a Scientifi c Object
During the Scientifi c Revolution, during More’s lifetime and later on, there 
occurred an ideological shift  as to what was expected of science. If we are al-
lowed a little simplifi cation, this shift  may be designated as a shift  from natu-
ral philosophy, intrinsically tied to metaphysics, to experimental philosophy 
and later physics, expanding under Newton’s famous motto, hypotheses 
non fi ngo. We can get a good idea of this shift  if we compare Descartes and 
Newton. In some regards, Descartes has a very modern project of physics 
but he founds this project on metaphysical grounds. Th is leads to a big gap 
13 More to Hyrne, 21 Aug. 1671, quoted in: GABBEY, “Henry More and the Limits of 
Mechanism,” p. 31.
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between the level of phenomenological description (e.g. of light refraction) 
and the more basic, ontological level where Descartes’s mostly speculative 
models are supposed to explain these phenomena (his theory of rotating 
light globules). Newton, on the other hand, manages to unify the overall 
picture (thanks – at least in part – to his introduction of calculus) – but 
reaches this goal at the cost of downplaying the metaphysical aspect to the 
point that it ultimately disappears from physics (or at least from its explicit 
discourse).14 In this dichotomy, More stands fully on the side of Descartes. 
Although he is a  member of the Royal Society, he is not really concerned 
with experimental results, he even shows open contempt for experimenting 
which, combined with his criticism of mechanicism, leads to a controversy 
with the more prominent members of the Society.15 While science was slowly 
becoming an endeavour to mathematically describe law-like regularities be-
tween measurable quantities standing in for various aspects of reality, More 
was much more interested in the ontological foundations of these relation-
ships and in their metaphysical consequences. Th at is why, for example, in 
the chapters on the air-pump experiments and on hydrostatics of his Enchi-
ridion Metaphysicum, he does not question the instruments, the techniques 
or the exactitude of the experimental results but the metaphysical lesson that 
we should draw from them. Th is framing of the debate is also the reason 
why he doesn’t feel he needs to provide an explanation as to how the “Spirit 
of Nature” does what it does.16 Interpreting phenomena and experiments 
so as to show that they contradict mechanical laws is for him proof enough 
that some non-mechanical factor is involved and if it is non-mechanical, it 
must be immaterial (since all matter obeys the laws of mechanics). In the 
case of phenomena involving non-living matter, this immaterial principle 
obviously cannot be any individual human or animal soul. Furthermore, 
it cannot be God either, as that would lead to a  crass and blasphemous 
14 For a  more detailed analysis, see Ladislav KVASZ, “Galileo, Descartes, and Newton – 
Founders of the Language of Physics.” Acta physica slovaca, vol. 62, 2012, no. 6, esp. p. 548ff . 
and 573ff . (519–614). A  more general description of this transformation can be found in 
Stephen GAUKROGER, Th e Emergence of a  Scientifi c Culture: Science and the Shaping of 
Modernity 1210–1685. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006, chap. 8–12.
15  Cf. HALL, “Henry More and the Scientifi c Revolution,” esp. p. 40f. Also Robert CROCKER, 
Henry More 1614–1687. A  Biography of the Cambridge Platonist. Dordrecht: Springer 2013,
p. 151ff .
16  At least not in the same sense as more experimentally oriented philosophers would expect 
him to do, that is on a level analogical to mechanical explanations. As we will see later, that is 
because of the fact that More takes the “Spirit of Nature” to be a principally diff erent type of 
explanation than mechanicism is.
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immanentism (and possibly even to pantheism). So the only option left  is 
a diff erent separate spiritual substance about which it can easily be proven 
that given the circumstances it must be omnipresent and devoid of any intel-
ligence and free will, leading us to the notion of a “Spirit of Nature”, quod 
erat demonstrandum.
Yet such a  systematic presentation of the introduction of the “Spirit
of Nature” into More’s system does not tell the whole story. Th e “Spirit 
of Nature” is a concept that came with a historical baggage that was very 
important for More. In a  tradition going from Platonicism and Stoicism, 
through Plotinus, later Neo-Platonists and Marsilio Ficino up to More, we 
fi nd very strongly rooted the idea that the whole universe is a living organ-
ism and that as such, it has to have a soul. Furthermore, in order to be able to 
act on its body, this soul – just as any soul – needs an intermediary, a vehicle 
(vehiculum, okhema), usually termed spirit (spiritus, pneuma). Th is spirit is 
sometimes described in more “spiritual” (in the contemporary sense) terms, 
sometimes in more material terms, but it is in any way something in between 
soul and body, allowing for the interaction of the two. According to this 
doctrine, we all have such spirits, and so does the world.17
While these concepts could hardly be considered scientifi c and while 
More transformed them quite a bit, we need to be aware of this origin of the 
concept of “Spirit of Nature” when considering its place. More’s primary 
motivation is metaphysical (the demonstration of the existence of souls) but 
it leads him into the domain of natural philosophy and, therefore, of sci-
ence. Th us More’s neglect of a more detailed study of the way the “Spirit of 
Nature” works is not a consequence of his using the concept intuitively, for 
he is not. It is only that the conceptual work done on the “Spirit of Nature” 
takes place within a diff erent context than that of experimental science. Th is 
is confi rmed if we consider the two most important occasions where he tells 
us more about the way the “Spirit of Nature” works.
Th e fi rst would be a  comment on the 13th chapter of the Enchiridion
Metaphysicum treating of the problem of a wooden plate placed in a bucket 
full of water. According to mechanical laws, the gravity pulling all the water 
down should hold the wooden plate in place, yet the plate rises to the surface 
17  Such a short summary is hardly exhaustive of the history of these concepts. More details can 
be found in Gérard VERBEKE, L’évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du stoïcisme à S. Augustin. 
Leuven: Desclée de Brouwer 1945; E. Ruth HARVEY, Th e Inward Wits. Psychological Th eory 
in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. London: Warburg Institute 1975, or in Dodds’s intro-
duction and commentary to his translation of Proclus’ Elements of Th eology (Eric R. DODDS 
– PROCLUS, Th e Elements of Th eology. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1963).
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nonetheless. Aft er proving that all possible mechanical explanations fail, More 
addresses some objections presented by Christoph Sturm and as part of his 
answer, lays down some laws according to which the “Spirit of Nature” acts:
First, that, although it [i.e. the “Spirit of Nature” – JJ] is one, it permeates all
the parts and particles of the matter in the bucket. Next, it not only permeates 
but vitally activates them. Th ird, that this Spirit puts forth this vital energeian 
from a certain omniform essential life in itself in the parts or particles of matter, 
according to given circumstances, in various ways. Fourth, that this omniform 
life which contains the laws of moving the matter of the world is within in-
dividual points as it were – if one may say so – of this Spirit of Nature. Fift h, 
fi nally, since this Spirit is a certain essential or substantial life containing the 
laws of the motions of the matter of the world, and sympatheia & synenergeia 
agree with a spirit as such, and fi nally the said Spirit of Nature is created by the 
most wise God, from these things it is clear that all its operations, motions, 
sympathies and synergies are so constituted as, according to certain general 
rules of the universe, God himself has foreseen that they will be.18 
According to this and to some later remarks as well,19 we thus see that the
“Spirit of Nature” really acts as a (at least vegetative) soul, making non-living 
matter alike to a  living body, therefore providing a  very diff erent sort of 
explanation than what later experimental philosophers would perceive as 
scientifi c.
Th e second insight into the way the “Spirit of Nature” works is provided 
collaterally, as part of the debate about action through contact. Besides all 
the phenomena already mentioned, More points out one more question that 
mechanicism can’t even ask, let alone answer, namely, how does mechani-
cism itself work? If we take a collision between two particles – the paradigm 
example of mechanical interaction and the basic explanatory principle of 
mechanistic philosophy – the fact that a  transmission of motion between 
the two particles occurs should not be taken for granted, thinks More. How 
is such a  thing possible? As most mechanistic philosophers would agree, 
matter is inert and passive but how exactly are we to understand this pas-
sivity? As opposed to the Cartesian conception of passivity as the inability 
18 Enchiridion Metaphysicum, Scholia to chap. XIII, sec. 4 (Alexander JACOB, More’s Manual 
of Metaphysics 2, p. 75).
19  E.g. “[the Spirit of Nature], with a corporeal instrument as it were, presses the bottom of the 
bucket, [...]; the Spirit of Nature, I say, and the watery particles, as if one living, not mechani-
cal, entity, act on the bottom of the bucket.” (ibid., p. 76).
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to generate any new motion (only conserving the quantity of it that God has 
imparted to the world), More believes the absolute passivity of matter simply 
to mean that a particle all by itself could never transmit any of its motion at 
all. Th e fi rst mention of this problem can be found as early as 1649 in a letter 
More sent to Descartes. Th ere, he follows up with one more objection: in 
Descartes’s metaphysical system, motion (just as rest) is a mode of substance 
and it is therefore quite unclear just how could either of them simply “jump” 
from one substance to another.20 At the time of this correspondence, More 
was still very much in his earlier, Neo-platonic period and his solution to 
this problem refl ects that. He proposes an emanationist theory in which 
there is no such thing as non-living matter – what we usually call body “is 
really a stupefi ed and sottish life, inasmuch as […] it constitutes the last and 
faintest shadow and image of the divine essence, which I take to be the most 
perfect life.”21 Th e problem is thus solved, as there is in fact no transmission 
of motion and it is the “sottish life” of the particle that allows it to set itself 
into motion upon being hit.
Later, More himself grew dissatisfi ed with this solution because such 
a  vitalism could easily create the impression that matter all by itself is 
enough to explain all forms of life thus threatening the belief in immaterial 
substances and God.22 Th e new explanation of this “action through contact
problem” that More brings to the table is – again – the “Spirit of Nature”. 
Th is of course changes completely the dynamic between explanations by 
mechanical laws and by the “Spirit of Nature” and More himself admits this, 
confessing that he is “abundantly assured that there is no purely Mechanicall 
Phaenomenon in the whole Universe.”23 Th is heavily impacts both the ques-
tion of distinguishing between mechanical and non-mechanical phenomena 
and the just mentioned analogy of the “Spirit of Nature” as if “enlivening” 
the non-living pieces of matter. While in so-called mechanical phenomena, 
the interaction of colliding pieces of matter may provide some sort of ex-
planatory intermediary level, they are ultimately caused by the “Spirit of 
Nature” as well. On this intermediary level, a mathematical description may 
be available – that would be Descartes’s mechanical laws, but that would also 
later be e.g. Newton’s law of gravitation. As such, mechanicism may very 
20  More to Descartes, 23 Jul 1649, in: ADAM – TANNERY (eds.), Oeuvres V, p. 382ff .
21  More to Descartes, 23 Jul 1649; English translation taken from Jasper REID, Th e Metaphysics
of Henry More. Dordrecht: Springer 2012, p. 247.
22  Th is change is related to the need to defend Christianity against a  new threat, namely 
Spinoza’s (perceived) divinization of matter.
23  MORE, Divine Dialogues, Th e Publisher (More) to the Reader, p. viii (emphasis omitted).
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well give us very exact predictions as to what is going to happen in some
experimental setup but what is important for More is that if we want to know 
how it happens (on a metaphysical level), mechanicism cannot but remain 
silent and the real answer is going to be that it is the “Spirit of Nature” that 
“vivifi es” and orders pieces of matter and their respective movements in 
such a way that makes the mechanical description possible.24
More even considered his theory of the “Spirit of Nature” to be open to 
(indirect) experimental verifi cation. Th e aforementioned confutations in the 
Enchiridion Metaphysicum are not all on the level of metaphysical specula-
tion. Th e chapters 12 to 22 are, among others, full of examples where More 
overcomes his dislike of experiments and gets into a very detailed analysis 
of experimental results to show how other, mechanistic, theories lead to 
consequences that blatantly contradict measured outcomes. As I  already 
mentioned, More’s method is mostly negative – he only shows that other 
theories fail to conform to the experience of our senses – but indirect as it 
may be, from More’s point of view, this still is an experimental verifi cation 
of the existence of the “Spirit of Nature”.
In another famous example, he is convinced experiments prove that the 
“Spirit of Nature” has no free will, as it can sometimes work blindly against 
its own interest. For example, when we place an empty tube bottom up in 
water and close down the hole with a  valve, the “Spirit of Nature” wants 
to balance up the diff erence of pressure. Yet, in trying to do  so, it pushes 
water against the valve, thus preventing itself from accomplishing the very 
thing it tries to do. Th e laws according to which the “Spirit of Nature” acts 
in these cases are “certain general plastic reasons implanted in it by God and 
most useful to the common good of the universe and destined to it, and suf-
fi ciently accommodated to the end towards which they aim in the ordinary 
course of Nature.”25 But in such experiments, the “Spirit of Nature”
is beset and assailed by the ludicrous artifi ces and useless curiosities of the 
human mind, and is drawn or provoked by irritation to put forth the power 
of some general plastic reason in circumstances thought of and put forward 
perversely and sharply, [so] it is most wisely that, in applying those general laws 
of motion on a given occasion, it is ensnared and impeded so that it does not 
24  As we can see, with the only diff erence of replacing activity inherent to matter by the “Spirit 
of Nature”, More’s later position on this matter is quite similar to the one presented in the 
correspondence with Descartes.
25 Enchiridion Metaphysicum, Scholia to chap. XIII, sec. 15 (JACOB, More’s Manual of 
Metaphysics 2, p. 91).
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attain the end to which those very laws naturally tend. All of which prove not, 
certainly, that the Hylarchic Principle [i.e. the “Spirit of Nature” – JJ] is nothing, 
but that it is not endowed with any counsel or reason or free judgement.26
Yet even from these considerations it is pretty clear that the experimental 
verifi cation More was working with is a bit diff erent from what we would 
usually expect. Th e “Spirit of Nature” was not for More a  scientifi c object 
in the sense of being an object of scientifi c research. Th at is because More 
was not a physicist or a natural scientist, he was a metaphysician or, at best, 
a natural philosopher. Yet in natural philosophy, metaphysics and natural 
science are very oft en related, especially in More’s time, and the “Spirit of 
Nature” fi nds itself exactly at this point of junction. Th at is, I believe, what 
creates this sense of tension when speaking of the “Spirit of Nature” as 
a scientifi c object – even in the fi eld of science, More’s motivation is always 
metaphysical. Yet insofar as the metaphysical foundations of science are 
a part of it, we have to consider the “Spirit of Nature” a scientifi c object; not 
necessarily something that science examines, but most defi nitely something 
that contributes in a non-trivial way to how science is structured.
If we then widen our view further, we may appreciate in which ways 
the “Spirit of Nature” impacts the overall shape of More’s metaphysical and 
natural philosophical system. First of all, there are the obvious theological 
implications – as has already been said, defending the existence of God was 
one of More’s leitmotivs and proving the existence of spiritual substances in
general was the fi rst step in doing that. More generally, the “Spirit of Nature” 
served in delimiting More’s overall metaphysical position. For one, he was 
very much aware of how dangerously close to pantheism his system may 
seem to some and the “Spirit of Nature” was defi nitely one of the tools that al-
lowed More to subtly navigate his position between extremes that he wanted 
to avoid (like pantheism or materialism). On a  less metaphysical note, the 
“Spirit of Nature” allowed More to group a certain set of phenomena by pos-
tulating a common, hidden cause for them. In this context, it should also be 
noted that most of the phenomena concerned were notoriously problematic 
for 17th century science (like gravitation or magnetism) and besides theories 
like those of Descartes (of gravitational vortices or magnetic effl  uvia), a lot of 
explanations considered were non-mechanistic (Kepler’s or Gilbert’s, to cite 
a few). All things considered, More’s spiritualistic theory was not necessarily 
worse than any of these.
26 Ibid.
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III. Newton’s Aether
To resume the fi rst part of my paper, I  tried to present the position of the 
“Spirit of Nature” within More’s system and to show why and how it in fact 
worked as a scientifi c object. Th e “Spirit of Nature” grouped a set of phenom-
ena and provided a unifi ed explanation for them, one More believed could 
be confi rmed by experimental data. At the same time, I have shown in what 
respects these reasons do not correspond to the expectations of modern sci-
ence. Th ese stem mostly from the sort of explanation the “Spirit of Nature” 
provided. For More, explanations in natural philosophy had to lead back to 
metaphysical causes behind the phenomena and as soon as modern science 
turned to explaining by presenting mathematical descriptions of observed 
regularities, the “Spirit of Nature” became just an extravagant metaphysical 
hypothesis. I would now like to turn my attention to Isaac Newton. While he 
is oft en regarded as a representative of the “new” approach in experimental 
philosophy (as I have mentioned above), he was still very much concerned 
with metaphysical matters and in these, similarities can be found between 
him and More that may throw an interesting light on the possible infl uence 
of the “Spirit of Nature” on the birth of modern science.
But let me fi rst make a  couple of tangential remarks concerning the 
further fate of action through contact. Initially, corpuscularists (just as we 
saw with Descartes) weren’t much open to perceiving action through contact 
as somehow problematic or needing any further explanation, even more so 
aft er the publication of Newton’s Principia and what some saw as the intro-
duction into physics of forces acting at a  distance. For many authors, the 
only acceptable interpretation of forces acting at a distance was one that re-
duced them to a series of immediate impulses in a medium linking the point 
of origin with the point where the force acts. In such a framework, action 
at a  distance is the explanandum and action through contact the explan-
ans that doesn’t itself need any further explanation. Later throughout the 
18th century, the idea of action at a distance slowly became more and more 
generally accepted, both among physicists and among philosophers. In this 
new ideological landscape, the perception of the problem of action through 
contact changed yet again. First of all, if action at a  distance is accepted, 
there is no reason to problematize action through contact as it can be seen as 
just a limit case of action at a null distance.27 Th is eventually led to a concep-
27 Th e other way round, since matter is impenetrable, even when hitting each other, two par-
ticles still don’t actually share any point of space. Th erefore, even action through contact is 
ultimately a form of action at a distance (Cf. Immanuel KANT, Metaphysical Foundations of 
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tion of matter where the ability to act at a  distance was not perceived as 
a superadded occult quality but rather as one of its intrinsic properties.28 On 
a more purely metaphysical level, action through contact fades into a much 
more general problem of causal relationship that becomes more and more 
popular, proceeding (as we saw) from the question of mind-body interaction 
in Descartes, through occasionalism up to such philosophers as Hume or 
the already mentioned Immanuel Kant. Even later on, the whole situation 
gets further complicated with the introduction of various fi eld theories. 
Th ese at fi rst sought to postulate some form of material substratum (mostly 
ether) for themselves, eff ectively reducing action at a distance to material ac-
tion through contact again. Later, however, they became much more abstract 
(for Feynman, for example, a fi eld is simply “any physical quantity which 
takes on diff erent values at diff erent points in space”29). As entities that are in 
a sense immaterial, they thus ultimately present yet another way of treating 
action through contact thanks to the fact that they can really be at the exact 
same place as the aff ected particle.30 To conclude this little detour, let me just 
add that the problem of action through contact resurfaced in a much diff er-
ent context in the beginning of the 20th century with the advent of quantum 
mechanics and the related problems of locality and separability31 but these 
are all subjects that would take us too far from our main focus.
Let us then proceed to Isaac Newton. A lot has already been written on 
possible connections between him and Henry More.32 Th ey certainly must 
have met during the time they both were at Cambridge. Although Newton 
read at least some of More’s works, explicit mentions of him are absent from 
his printed works and rather sporadic in the manuscripts (but then again in 
Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 51 [513]). A modern ver-
sion of the same argument is analyzed in Marc LANGE, An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Physics: Locality, Fields, Energy and Mass. Oxford: Blackwell 2002.
28  See Roger J. BOSCOVICH, A Th eory of Natural Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court Publishing 
1922, and more notably KANT, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, for two diff erent 
attempts at building such a theory of matter.
29  Richard FEYNMAN, Th e Feynman Lectures on Physics Vol II [online]. 1970. Available at: 
<http://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/II_01.html#Ch1-S2> [retrieved 30. 10. 2016].
30  For more on this, see Mary B. HESSE, Forces and Fields. Th e Concept of Action at a Distance
in the History of Physics. Mineola: Dover 2005, chap. 8.
31  See for example LANGE, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics, and Bernard
d’ESPAGNAT, On Physics and Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006.
32 Th e classical references are Alexandre KOYRÉ, From the Closed World to the Infi nite
Universe. Baltimore: Th e John Hopkins Press 1957, and Edwin A. BURTT, Th e Metaphysical 
Foundations of Modern Physical Science. London: Kegan Paul 1925.
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general, Newton only rarely quotes or mentions any of his contemporaries). 
It is generally taken for granted that Newton’s conception of absolute space 
as the sensorium of God is heavily inspired by More’s Enchiridion Metaphy-
sicum but otherwise, scholars have been rather careful when trying to trace 
More’s possible infl uences on Newton, especially given the fact that More 
was not the only Cambridge Platonist and a lot of things Newton might have 
taken from him, he might just as well have taken from at least several other 
people, like Isaac Barrow or Ralph Cudworth (not to mention possible shared 
older, Stoic or Neo-Platonic sources). Especially with this last point in mind, 
it is not my intention to make any strong claims about links between More 
and Newton. As I already pointed out, the “Spirit of Nature” is part of a fam-
ily of notions of a spiritus mundi or pneuma with a tradition ranging back 
at least to Ancient Neo-Platonists and Stoics. Just like More, Newton was 
familiar with this tradition and it has already been argued that it had some 
infl uence on his metaphysical ideas. What I  would like to do  in this part 
of my paper is to show a reading of Newton where his attempts at coming 
up with a cause of gravity are analogical to More’s attempts of introducing 
the “Spirit of Nature”, the diff erences being ultimately only ones of empha-
sis – on mathematical descriptions of regularities amongst phenomena for 
Newton, and on a coherent metaphysical system as a whole for More. Should 
this reading be correct, it would allow us to see Newton in a bit of a diff erent 
light, as well as further highlight the respects in which the “Spirit of Nature” 
both can and cannot be considered a scientifi c object. From a more historical 
point of view, it might also serve as at least circumstantial evidence of More’s 
possible infl uence on Newton.33
What cause Newton might have attributed to gravity is one of the most 
notorious subjects of Newton scholarship and it is not possible for us to fully 
enter into it. Th e two classical interpretations are that Newton was convinced 
that gravity had to have a mechanical cause or that its immaterial cause was 
God.34 One of the loci classici of the debate is Newton’s correspondence with
33  It should be noted, in this context, that there is a very close relationship between absolute 
(divine) space and the “Spirit of Nature” that are both crucial elements of More’s (late) philo-
sophical system. See JACOB, More’s Manual of Metaphysics 1, p. xxxviff .
34  See e.g. Richard S. WESTFALL, Never at Rest. A Biography of Isaac Newton. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1983; Alexandre KOYRÉ, “Gravity an Essential Property 
of Matter?” In: Alexandre KOYRÉ, Newtonian Studies. London: Chapman & Hall 1965;
I. Bernard COHEN, “Newton’s Th ird Law and Universal Gravitation.” In: SCHEURER, P. B. 
– DE BROCK, G. (eds.), Newton’s Scientifi c and Philosophical Legacy. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1988,
pp. 25–53. A good survey of the earlier phase of this debate can be found in John HENRY, 
“‘Pray Do Not Ascribe Th at Notion to Me’: God and Newton’s Gravity.” In: FORCE, J. E. – 
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Richard Bentley where Newton repeatedly denies that gravity should be “es-
sential and inherent to Matter”.35 In the following letter, Newton elaborates 
on that subject:
It is inconceivable, that inanimate brute Matter should, without the Mediation 
of something else, which is not material, operate upon, and eff ect other Matter 
without mutual Contact, as it must be, if Gravitation in the Sense of Epicurus, 
be essential and inherent in it. And this is one Reason why I desired you would 
not ascribe innate Gravity to me. Th at Gravity should be innate, inherent and 
essential to Matter, so that one Body may act upon another at a distance thro’ 
a Vacuum, without the Mediation of any thing else, by and through which their 
Action and Force be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an Absurd-
ity, that I believe no Man who has in philosophical Matters a competent Faculty 
of thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an Agent acting 
constantly according to certain Laws; but whether this Agent be material or 
immaterial, I have left  to the consideration of my Readers.36
Given the failure of mechanical explanations (a material aether would slow 
down the course of planets), this passage was oft en taken to mean that the 
only option left  is for there to be an immaterial principle causing gravita-
tional attraction. Now although most scholars have immediately identifi ed 
this principle as God, the connection does not seem so certain. In one of the 
more refi ned versions of this argument,37 Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, using the 
so-called Classical Scholia, quite convincingly shows infl uences of ancient 
theories of pneuma and spiritus mundi on Newton’s thoughts on the subject 
of gravity. Th e last step, however, identifying (in Newton’s view) this ancient 
pneuma with the Christian God, still seems unwarranted and based mostly 
on too literal an understanding of God’s omnipresence and of space as His 
sensorium. Th is idea defi nitely seems at odds with the conception of God’s 
transcendence Newton seems to have held.38
POPKIN, R. H. (eds.), Th e Books of Nature and Scripture. Recent Essays on Natural Philosophy,
Th eology, and Biblical Criticism in the Netherlands of Spinoza’s Time and the British Isles of 
Newton’s time. Dordrecht: Springer 1994, pp. 123–147.
35  I. Bernard COHEN (ed.), Isaac Newton’s Papers & Letters on Natural Philosophy.  Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press 1978, p. 298.
36  COHEN (ed.), Isaac Newton’s Papers & Letters, p. 302f.
37  Betty J. T. DOBBS, “Newton’s Alchemy and his ‘Active Principle’ of Gravitation.” In: 
SCHEURER – DE BROCK (eds.), Newton’s Scientifi c and Philosophical Legacy, pp. 55–81.
38 Th is is conclusively argued in HENRY, “Pray Do Not Ascribe Th at Notion to Me,” p. 132f.
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According to Newton, God is actually present everywhere in the world, 
yet He certainly doesn’t bother with directly causing gravitation or other 
natural phenomena. For More, this is exactly where the “Spirit of Nature” 
comes in – a notion, I might add in reference to B. J. T. Dobbs’s article, that 
as we have seen is a direct descendant of the stoic pneuma or Neo-Platonic 
spiritus mundi. Given the gratuity of the jump from immaterial substance
to God himself, the question we should ask is whether all the evidence that 
Dobbs has gathered doesn’t actually point rather in the direction of a spir-
itual agent similar to the “Spirit of Nature”.39
Pursuing this line of thought further, I think we might fi nd it sheds some 
new light on other related subjects. At this point, it is very important to realize 
that both the pneuma and the spiritus mundi were entities traditionally consid-
ered to have an intermediary status between body and spirit, being in certain 
respects both, in others neither one nor the other.40 Th is position is still very 
clearly visible in More’s early philosophical poems, where e.g. the “Mundane 
spirit” is defi ned as “that which is the spirit of the world, or Universe. I mean 
by it not an Intellectual spirit, but a fi ne unfi xt, attenuate, subtill, ethereall 
substance, the immediate vehicle of plasticall or sensitive life.”41 And although 
later, as we saw and under the infl uence of Descartes, More opted for a much 
more radical dualism, the “Spirit of Nature” remains a somewhat problematic 
entity in that it still bears some residual marks of its original ambiguity. In 
a similar fashion, we don’t necessarily have to see Newton’s possible solutions 
as divided into two radically separate branches (material or immaterial) but 
rather as complementary attempts at describing, in terms of 17th century dual-
ism, such an intermediate, partly material, partly spiritual concept.
As I  have already mentioned, any material theory of a  gravitational 
aether had to account for the fact that this aether does not also signifi cantly 
slow down the planets. Th is seems to be the main problem why Newton re-
nounced a material cause of gravity in the fi rst place, and it is also the reason 
why, when he came with another take on the aether in the “aether queries” of 
the 1717 edition of the Opticks, he explicitly defi ned this “new” aether as so 
extremely rarefi ed that it couldn’t possibly aff ect the movement of the plan-
39  In a diff erent article, though, Dobbs presents a similar argument without this last identi-
fi cation of the pneuma with God (Betty J. T. DOBBS, “Newton’s Alchemy and his Th eory of 
Matter.” Isis, vol. 73, 1982, no. 4, pp. 511–528).
40  Th is point is several times emphasized also by Dobbs (DOBBS, “Newton’s Alchemy and his 
Th eory of Matter,” p. 523 or 526f.).
41  Henry MORE, Philosophical Poems. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1878, 
Interpretation Generall, p. 163.
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ets. He speaks of a medium “700 000 times more elastick than our Air, and 
above 700 000 times more rare [...]. And so small a resistance would scarce 
make any sensible alteration in the Motions of the Planets in ten thousand 
Years.”42 To explain this rarity, Newton claimed the particles of aether had 
to “endeavour to recede from one another.”43 Th is is a  little awkward as it 
seems to make the aether itself depend on forces acting at a distance, thus 
circularly relying on what it was supposed to explain. Steff en Ducheyne 
pointed out that this aether doesn’t necessarily have to be material44 but then 
the question would be how such an immaterial aether can still be composed 
of particles. Yet if we accept with B. J. T. Dobbs that Newton’s thinking about 
the cause of gravity grew from traditional aether and pneuma theories and
if we fully accept that these traditional conceptions defi ed strictly dualistic 
categorization, we may take the Opticks aether to be yet another attempt of 
describing such an ambiguous concept in scientifi c terms. In this context, 
it should also be noted that traditional descriptions of this intermediary 
aether make use of the same metaphor (though less “mathematized”) – the 
aether is a spirit, yet so gross it is almost a body; and a body but one so subtle 
and so rare, it is almost a spirit.45
Such an understanding would also help make a  much closer link be-
tween Newton’s “mechanistically inspired” material aether and the aether of 
his earlier, alchemical works. It is by now generally accepted that Newton’s 
alchemical studies were the source of a lot of his later ideas in physics but 
a huge discontinuity is perceived between the alchemical aether and that of 
the Opticks.46 Although it is true that the aether of Th e Vegetation of Metals
is not described as composed of particles endowed with repulsive forces, 
Newton does say it is “by many degrees more thin & rare then air”47 and he
also connects it to the same phenomena as in the Opticks (light, heat, mag-
netism but also vegetative life!). Th is alchemical aether is also described as 
42 Isaac NEWTON, Optics. Mineola: Dover 1952, p. 352f.
43 Ibid.
44  Steff en DUCHEYNE, “Newton on Action at a Distance and the Cause of Gravity.” Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science Part A, vol. 42, 2011, no. 1, pp. 154–159.
45 Cf. Eric R. DODDS – PROCLUS, Th e Elements of Th eology. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1963, 
p. 315.
46  See for example John HENRY, “Gravity and De Gravitatione: Th e Development of Newton’s 
Ideas on Action at a Distance.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, vol. 42,
2011, no. 1, pp. 11–27.
47  Isaac NEWTON, Th e Vegetation of Metals. Dibner Collection, Smithsonian, MS 1031 
B, 3v [online]. 1674?. Available at: <http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/newton/mss/norm/
ALCH00081> [retrieved 7. 11. 2016].
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“the material soule of all matter” or “a vehicle to some more active spirit,”48
quite clearly demonstrating its intermediate corporeo-spiritual character. 
All these, as many other expressions found in the manuscript, could also 
have been taken straight from any of More’s early works – or from other 
Cambridge Platonists’, for that matter. Th e point, here again, is not to claim 
any direct infl uence of More on Newton, but rather to open up a new point 
of view on Newton’s aether through showing the functional similarities 
between it and More’s “Spirit of Nature”.
Besides these similarities, however, there are also diff erences; diff er-
ences that again relate to the shift  from natural to experimental philosophy. 
More’s primary concern was metaphysics while Newton, though also obvi-
ously concerned with such matters, tried to keep them away from his more 
mathematical and physical research. In this sense, the law of gravitation was 
more important for Newton than any metaphysical principle we may try to 
put behind it. And without trying to reduce the importance of the meta-
physical and alchemical part of Newton’s thinking, without – as has so oft en 
been done – trying to make Newton into “the fi rst positivist”, it seems quite 
clear this shift  of focus was at least in part due to the fact that he considered 
these mathematical questions more fi t objects of scientifi c research.
At the same time, Newton obviously looked for an (at least partially) 
immaterial cause of gravity and while I agree with Dobbs that this immate-
rial cause drew on traditional conceptions of pneuma and spiritus mundi
(possibly at least partially mediated by Henry More), I do not think however 
that Newton identifi ed this cause with God. What, then, would this immate-
rial agent be? For More, it was an omnipresent and blindly programmed 
“Spirit of Nature”. For Newton, it might have been something similar, or 
possibly a not completely material aether, as the one described in the Op-
ticks. Th rough all their superfi cial diff erences, all these options would be (on 
our reading) just diff erent attempts at adapting the traditional conception of 
a pneuma or spiritus mundi to the framework of the new physics.
Conclusion
While it doesn’t seem obvious from the point of view of contemporary sci-
ence, animistic and spiritual notions had for a long time a strong infl uence 
on the problems of action at a distance49 and in a way, this article may be
48 Ibid., p. 4r.
49 See HESSE, Forces and Fields.
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considered a more detailed case study of one such example. We have seen 
Henry More’s “Spirit of Nature” as a  late fruit of a  tradition of notions of 
spiritus mundi used within an early modern context as an explanation for 
various seemingly non-mechanical phenomena. I have tried to show, on the 
one hand, in which respects it may be considered a scientifi c notion and, on 
the other hand, in which respects it may not. Of course, these considerations 
depend a  lot on our expectations of what science ought to do and, during 
More’s lifetime, these expectations were undergoing quite a radical change. 
Th e “Spirit of Nature” thus worked as a scientifi c object in that it provided 
an explanation of the metaphysical workings behind various phenomena 
(mechanical or not). Most notably, it “explained” action through contact, 
thus eff ectively providing the grounding underlying any mechanical expla-
nation at all. Yet it never had the possibility of fully entering the discourse 
of science, because it is exactly this connection with metaphysics that later 
science tried to sever under the famous motto “hypotheses non fi ngo”. Fun-
nily enough, for Newton himself, though he was very careful about “framing 
hypotheses”, metaphysical concerns, though not part of the mathematical 
treatment of the given questions, were still very important.
A comparison between More’s “Spirit of Nature” and Newton’s inquir-
ies into the cause of gravity seems to vindicate B. J. T. Dobbs’s claim that 
Newton drew from theories of pneuma or spiritus mundi. Furthermore, we 
should keep in mind that this concept was traditionally one of an interme-
diate substance between matter and spirit – the traces of which ambiguity 
can, in my opinion, be traced both in More and Newton, even though both 
seem to work in a more or less dualistic framework. Under this perspective, 
Newton’s various attempts at providing a metaphysical explanation of the 
cause of gravity are ultimately only attempts to fi t this intermediate concept 
into the new science. In this sense, these attempts are similar to what More 
tried to do with his “Spirit of Nature”, although both the specifi c ways of ac-
commodating the given concept and what either author perceived to be what 
ultimately matters are diff erent. Th ese similarities and diff erences allows us 
to see how close and at the same time distant More and Newton were and, 
regardless of any possible direct infl uence of More on Newton, they also 
let us appreciate how “spiritual successors” to the “Spirit of Nature” helped 
shape the face of modern science.
Jacques Joseph
